Artículo de Uzi Arad en "Ha´a retz" del 23-8-02

El formateado es mío (L. B.-B.)

The first reaction by the United States to the attacks on it last September was quite instinctive, even though it contained an innovative element that set a precedent, whereby regimes that give shelter to terror pay with their survival. In the wake of Afghanistan, the question of the "next stage" arises. The conceptual answer was given in President George W. Bush's State of the Union address, in which he expanded the scope by linking the threats of terror to the arming of dangerous regimes with non-conventional weaponry. On the new front line that Bush drew - "the axis of evil" - he marked Iraq and Iran.

Half a year later, at West Point, the president moved up a rung in his presentation of the concept of a pre-emptive strike. The United States, he argued, will not be able to allow itself to wait until the "evil regimes" are equipped with non-conventional weapons; it must take measures against the threats in a timely way and hence the need for pre-emptive action.

The practical difficulty now faced by the Unites States comes from the possibility that a pre-emptive attack on Iraq could drag that country into using non-conventional weapons in response. This would cause, in the short run, the very outcome that the attack is supposed to prevent in the long run. The dangerous moment derives from the possibility that an American attack is liable to push Saddam Hussein into feeling that he has nothing to lose, nullifying restraining considerations and leaving intact the urge for retaliation.

To this it should be added that Saddam has threatened in the past that if he is attacked, he would respond in a punitive way, hinting that for him non-conventional weaponry would be the weaponry of "no alternative.' His ability to inflict damage is not trivial (his deputy Tariq Aziz noted to Richard Butler that the biological weapons would be aimed at Israel). It must be remembered that in the past Saddam authorized his subordinates, in advance, to use non-conventional weapons should contact with him be cut off (a logical deterrent move - on his part).

In light of this situation, the United States has two main strategic options: the attack option - to act militarily to topple Saddam's regime and install a new regime in Iraq, and later on to make sure that it is disarmed of its non-conventional weapons; and the enforcement option - to threaten the use of force, without necessarily implementing it, in order to force Iraq to accept a disarmament process that will be more intrusive and effective than its predecessor.

Under the attack option, various modes of action would be possible, but in all of them, to avoid pushing Saddam into an extreme position, it is possible to leave him a way out by making it clear to him that if he refrains from the use of non-conventional weapons - nothing bad will happen to him and his immunity will be ensured. However, he would endanger his life if he were to authorize the use of non-conventional weapons. The identical message can also be transmitted to his subordinates.
After all, the logic of a strategy of decapitation is suitable mainly for deterrence as the ultimate threat. This is not the case with an attack strategy, certainly not toward a foe who has non-conventional weaponry and the option of pre-delegation at his disposal. The attack option, which is likely to be preferable, would then be controlled and its decapitation aspect would be expressed in the initial and paralyzing strike at the command and control systems.

The enforcement option derives its validity from the existence of an attack option. The United States can try to leverage its attack capabilities without realizing its potential in actuality to force a regime of supervision and disarmament on Saddam. From his perspective, if the alternative is an American onslaught the end of which is his deposition, perhaps he will try to spare himself this. This is the playing field toward which Saddam is "pulling," in the hope of buying time and gaining space to maneuver and tantalize.

Knowing this, Vice President Richard Cheney recently rejected the enforcement option, whereas Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has expressed his feeling that a pre-emptive strike cannot be avoided. Bush, however, said that he would examine the option of inspection and would consult with allies before he acts. Possibly the president wanted to prove to his critics that he does not want to rush into battle and in fact has acted to prepare the ground for the attack option. This is what former secretary of state Henry Kissinger has advised him, arguing that a change in regime in Iraq should be subordinated declaratively to the need to disarm it of non-conventional weapons. Kissinger prefers the controlled attack option, on condition that it be properly prepared diplomatically.

This, then, is the stage at which the United States is now, as it is adopting a daring new strategy. The strategy it adopted about a year ago raised the threshold of its aims every few months, but this, meanwhile, only on the declarative plane. The implementation is still ahead of it and the dilemma is not simple. The moment of decision is approaching; it will be a moment of truth for Bush and the new strategic doctrine that the United States under his leadership has taken upon itself.



The writer is the head of the Institute of Policy and Strategy at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya.