By going to the United Nations, President Bush did the right thing from the standpoint of both America's values and America's national interests. By delivering a forceful speech to the court of world opinion, he took the moral high ground on the issue of Iraq. Further, he surely convinced many potential allies that the cause is just. By demonstrating diplomatic resolve in the weeks ahead, he now has a good chance, though not a certainty, of winning the support of the Security Council. And that would go a long way toward reducing the potential political, economic and foreign policy costs of this difficult, but certainly justified, undertaking.

Going in, the question was why the United States believes force is now necessary. The president answered with a powerful indictment of Saddam Hussein -- the "case" his critics have long demanded. It focused in a clear, straightforward way on weapons of mass destruction, inspections, human rights, prisoners of war and terrorism. In each instance, he said, Hussein has broken his word and violated U.N. resolutions with near impunity. "By breaking every pledge -- by his deceptions and by his cruelties -- Saddam Hussein has made the case against himself."

Equally important is what President Bush did not say. He spoke of the suffering of the Iraqi people, the threat to regional neighbors and the world, generally, and the indignities suffered by the United Nations. But he did not try to link Iraq with the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, nor -- with the justified exception of the assassination attempt on a former American president and one missing U.S. pilot -- did he argue in terms of other specific U.S. interests.

Having made the case against Iraq, the president then asked questions of his own: "Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?" From this point forward, the question is no longer why the United States believes force is necessary to implement resolutions involving Iraq, but why the United Nations, after years of inaction, does not now agree.

The administration's challenge now is to persuade the United Nations to act on its principles. This will require diplomatic follow-up on the president's offer to "work with the U.N. Security Council on a new resolution to meet our common challenge."

The resolution must be simple, clear and easy to understand. And it must provide authority -- "all necessary means" -- to enforce it. It should also be sufficiently objective and specific in its elements so that compliance or noncompliance can easily be judged and Security Council member countries will not be inclined to argue that the United States is simply looking for an excuse to go it alone.

What is absolutely not acceptable is the idea of two resolutions -- one demanding action by Iraq, the second, to come later (maybe), authorizing enforcement. This would give Saddam Hussein two bites at the apple, first by stonewalling on compliance, then by fighting the enforcement resolution. In 1990 the Soviet Union proposed two separate resolutions to respond to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The United States, quite properly, did not agree.

To the extent that the resolution calls (as it should) for Iraq to admit weapons inspectors with a warrant to go anywhere, anytime, without exceptions, they could, and should, be backed up with a United Nations security force on Iraqi soil, preferably under U.S. command, with the means (and under clear orders) to thwart all attempts by Iraq to block or delay the inspectors. Failure to provide for this type of "coercive" inspection is one reason prior inspection regimes have failed.

Any resolution should contain a deadline for Hussein's compliance. The deadline should be coordinated with military planners, to give them time to move sufficient forces to the region to enforce the new resolution (if there is one) or the old resolutions (if there isn't). And those planners should, of course, start soon to move the necessary assets so the member countries, indeed the world, will know that we are serious. Further, it is very likely that resorting to "all necessary means" -- i.e., military force -- will result in regime change. Therefore, the United States must have a detailed plan for occupying and governing post-Hussein Iraq. And, of course, before force is used, the administration's political and military planners also need a strategy for responding to the risk that Hussein, sensing that the end is near, will use weapons of mass destruction on U.S. or U.N. forces, his Iraqi enemies or regional neighbors, including Israel.

Thanks to the rotating leadership and membership of the Security Council, including the possibility of veto, getting any resolution that authorizes the use of force will be a fairly difficult political task. Careful planning and direct involvement by the president and the secretary of state are likely to be necessary. If it should become apparent that we cannot get a satisfactory, reasonable resolution out of the Security Council, either because of a threatened veto or a shortage of votes, we should carefully consider whether to go ahead anyway and call for a vote. Doing so would tell the world which countries stand for doing right and which stand for doing business.

The president made it sufficiently clear, I believe, that he intends to go forward, with or without a new resolution from the Security Council. "By heritage and by choice," he said, the United States will stand up for security "and for the permanent rights and hopes of mankind." Acting alone or with a few key allies will make the undertaking more costly -- politically, economically and in terms of other U.S. foreign policy interests. But, sadly, doing nothing is potentially the most costly strategy of all.

Win or lose, going to the United Nations will also help the president win the support of the American people and, therefore, of Congress, which is politically desirable, if not legally necessary, for any major military action.

It would be truly regrettable if the United Nations failed now to enforce its own resolutions. This would cast a shadow of irrelevance over the world body, and its resolutions could henceforth be regarded by supporters and detractors alike as debating-club exercises, full of sound and fury. . . .

The writer was secretary of state from 1989 to 1992.