IRAQ'S 'YES' ISN'T QUITE GOOD ENOUGH
Washington must build support for specific demands.
Artículo de PHILIP H. GORDON and MICHAEL O'HANLON, en "Los Angeles Times" del 18-9-02.
Philip H. Gordon and Michael O'Hanlon are senior fellows at the Brookings
Institution.
Was Monday's decision by Iraq to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors, without
preconditions, a good thing or a bad thing?
Optimists will say that inspections did uncover and destroy many of Saddam
Hussein's illicit weapons in the 1990s and that a continuation of inspections
and deterrence is preferable to a major war. Critics of the idea will worry that
Hussein is just promising inspections to stall our march to war and that he will
obstruct the work of inspectors once the threat of a U.S. invasion recedes.
In fact, it is too soon to know whether the Bush administration has achieved a
success. It has at least managed to make the threat of war real enough to
convince Hussein to soften his blustery stance. But no Iraqi disarmament has
occurred, and none is guaranteed.
Moreover, Hussein outmaneuvered the administration this week, accepting a
relatively lenient set of demands based on the existing U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1284 before the United States could work with other countries to
develop a new and tougher resolution linked to the threat of force. Because
virtually all U.S. allies would prefer even a flawed inspection process to war,
the administration's job of crafting an ultimatum that enjoys international
support is now more difficult. Russia has already challenged the notion that a
new resolution is necessary at this point.
The good news is that the administration still should be able to recover.
Specifically, it should be able to lead the international community in crafting
a Security Council resolution that toughens the 1999 U.N. Resolution 1284--which
made some sanctions relief contingent on Iraqi cooperation with weapons
inspectors, rather than complete disarmament. The U.S. needs to keep arguing
that Iraqi disarmament, rather than inspections per se, is the core demand that
must be met before the lifting of sanctions can be considered. It needs to get
the rest of the world behind this view. And it needs a new and stronger
resolution to formally remind Hussein of the consequences of noncompliance.
A new resolution must insist, of course, that Iraq readmit weapons inspectors,
fully support their work and ensure their immediate access to any and all
sites--including presidential palaces and compounds.
The United Nations must have exclusive prerogative to determine the composition
of inspection teams and be able to immediately grant asylum to Iraqi weapons
experts and their families should they provide information to the U.N. that
could put their lives at risk.
The resolution also must demand that Iraq vigorously start the disarmament
process. It must account for, display and allow U.N. destruction of certain
stocks of chemical and biological weapons and munitions that we know it
possesses.
It must do all this within a short, specific period.
Looking to the longer term, Iraq must agree to intrusive, long-term monitoring
of its weapons capabilities. These demands are already found in existing
resolutions, but they need to be spelled out.
Specifically, the international community needs the right to demand no-notice
inspections whenever and wherever it wishes, even if sanctions against Iraq are
lifted someday.
Restrictions will have to remain on Iraq's oil revenue, and industrial countries
will have to establish rules for controlling Baghdad's importing of potentially
dangerous technologies.
The U.S. also needs to hold separate talks with Iraq's neighbors. Because these
countries would all prefer to avoid a U.S. invasion of Iraq, they need to agree
to stop their illicit trade with that nation--by which oil comes out and many
goods, including weapons and dual-use technology, enter Iraq. This would require
detailed negotiations with Jordan, Turkey, Syria and perhaps even Iran,
including consideration of some combination of economic incentives and strong
pressure that would depend in its details on the country in question.
These demands are tough, but they are also specific and focused on Iraq's
weapons rather than its internal political practices. They are far from
unreasonable, as U.S. allies should recognize. And yet they also create an
ultimatum tough enough that allows us to take yes for an answer from the Iraqi
regime. At the moment, Iraq's yes is not quite good enough.